IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdi/opques/qef_594_21.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The EU bank insolvency framework: could less be more?

Author

Listed:
  • Giovanni Majnoni

    (Banca d'Italia)

  • Gabriele Bernardini

    (Banca d'Italia)

  • Andreas Dal Santo

    (Solidus Capital Group)

  • Maurizio Trapanese

    (Banca d'Italia)

Abstract

The framework for bank crisis management in the Banking Union (BU) complies with multiple criteria. Each of these criteria is based on a sound policy rationale; however, when combined, they can generate unintended consequences that undermine the effectiveness of the system, highlighting a case of fallacy of composition. This paper suggests that a piecemeal reform is not adequate to tackle the framework’s shortcomings. A broader effort is required to streamline the current criteria into a single rulebook, achieving effectiveness through simplification. The successful experience of the US framework for bank failure management provides a useful benchmark. It shows that the generalized, if not exclusive, reliance on a single, clearly defined, easily measurable and quickly actionable criterion – the Least Cost Test – makes it possible to offer full protection to taxpayers and to contain the destruction of value caused by bank failures, thereby safeguarding the economy. We suggest that its adoption by the BU would help to frame a common approach to failing banks of all sizes and would provide a unifying force and a solution to the geographic and institutional fragmentation of the current set-up.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Majnoni & Gabriele Bernardini & Andreas Dal Santo & Maurizio Trapanese, 2021. "The EU bank insolvency framework: could less be more?," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 594, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_594_21
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2021-0594/QEF_594_21.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial crises; international regulation;

    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_594_21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bdigvit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.