Unemployment Persistence, Central Bank Independence and Inflation Performance in the OECD Countries
We test the Barro-Gordon model extended to allow for persistence in unemployment. First, we build an index of central bank independence and measures of persistence, and then we compare them with inflation performance in OECD countries. Our results show, as theory predicts, a robust negative relationship between the degree of independence and the level and variance of inflation.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
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