IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Functions on the Central Bank

Listed author(s):
  • Eduardo Lundberg

This paper analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining the banking supervisory functions at the Banco Central do Brasil (BCB). First, these pros and cons are identified and listed using the economic literature, after a brief analysis of the ongoing debate and international experience regarding monetary policy, independence of the central bank and banking supervision. Then it is discussed the international tendencies as related to central bank reforms and the respective supervisory systems, including an annex panel of the experience of 40 different countries. The first and clearest tendency identified is to withdraw supervisory functions from the monetary authorities, normally seen as capable of strengthening the "central bank independence". The second trend - and one that seems to be gaining strength - is merger of the agencies charged with banking, securities and insurance supervision into a single agency, enhancing their capacity to perform the financial groups' consolidated supervision. There is no firm conclusion as the more effective institutional arrangement related to banking supervision under the control of the central bank or another institution.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department in its series Working Papers Series with number 2.

in new window

Date of creation: Jul 2000
Handle: RePEc:bcb:wpaper:2
Contact details of provider: Web page:

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bcb:wpaper:2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Francisco Marcos Rodrigues Figueiredo)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.