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Governance Mechanisms in Spanish Financial Intermediaries

  • Rafel Crespí


    (Departament Economia i Empresa, Universitat Illes Balears)

  • Miguel A. García-Cestona


    (Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)

  • Vicente Salas Fumas


    (Departamento de Economia y Direccion de Empresas, Universidad de Zaragoza)

This paper examines the governance of Spanish Banks around two main issues. First, does a poor economic performance activate those governance interventions that favor the removal of executive directors and the merger of non-performing banks? And second, does the relationship between governance intervention and economic performance vary with the ownership form of the bank? Our results show that a bad performance does activate governance mechanisms in banks, although for the case of Savings Banks intervention is confined to a merger or acquisition. Nevertheless, the distinct ownership structure of Savings Banks does not fully protect non-performing banks from disappearing. Product-market competition compensates for those weak internal governance mechanisms that result from an ownership form which gives voice to several stakeholder groups.

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Paper provided by Department of Business Economics, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona in its series Working Paper with number 200209.

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Date of creation: Sep 2002
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Handle: RePEc:bbe:wpaper:200209
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