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Bank-runs und Moral-hazard


  • Gontermann, Andreas


Im klassischen Modell von Diamond und Dybvig (1983) werden Bank-runs durch sich selbst erfüllende pessimistische Erwartungen der Anleger provoziert. Sie sind damit ein Sonnenflecken-Phänomen. Die spekulativen Runs können u.a. durch eine Einlagenversicherung vermieden werden. Allerdings schafft die Einlagenversicherung ein Problem moralischen Risikos: Banken verhalten sich risikofreudiger. Anhand einer modifizierten Version des Diamond-Dybvig-Modells wird in diesem Aufsatz gezeigt, dass die Moral-hazard-Problematik nicht beseitigt werden kann, indem man das System der Einlagensicherung wieder abschafft. Auch in einer Welt ohne Einlagenversicherung tauchen Probleme moralischen Risikos auf. Überdies kann Moral-hazard � Banken spekulieren kurzfristig mit den Ersparnissen ihrer Kunden � selbst die Ursache für Bank-runs sein. Dabei werden die Runs durch ungünstige �Fundamentaldaten� ausgelöst, d.h. sie sind kein Sonnenflecken-Phänomen mehr. In the classical Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of financial intermediation bank runs are the result of self-fulfilling pessimistic expectations, i.e. they are a sunspot phenomenon. Speculative bank runs can be avoided by introducing a deposit insurance system. Unfortunately, the deposit insurance scheme creates a moral hazard problem because banks have incentives to engage in more risky investments once it is introduced. In the present paper we modify the Diamond-Dybvig-model and show that the moral hazard problem cannot be discarded by simply abolishing the deposit insurance system. Moral hazard is present even without deposit insurance. Moreover, moral hazard, i.e. banks� gambling with depositors� funds, itself can cause bank runs, whereby the runs are the result of unfavourable fundamentals. They are no longer a sunspot phenomenon.

Suggested Citation

  • Gontermann, Andreas, 2003. "Bank-runs und Moral-hazard," University of Regensburg Working Papers in Business, Economics and Management Information Systems 387, University of Regensburg, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bay:rdwiwi:294

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    Bankenkrise ; Moral Hazard ; Asymmetrische Information; Bank-runs ; Finanzintermediation; Financial Intermediation ; Bank Runs ; Asymmetric Information ; Moral Hazard;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • E53 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Deposit Insurance
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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