Multi-sided Bohm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core
We introduce the class of multi-sided B ohm-Bawerk assignment games, which generalizes the well-kown two-sided B ohm-Bawerk assignment games to situations with an arbitrary number of sectors. We reach the extreme core allocations of any multi-sided B ohm- Bawerk assignment game by means of an associated convex game defined on the set of sectors instead of the set of sellers and buyers. We also study when the core of these games is stable in the sense of von Neumann-Morgenstern.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.ere.ub.es
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bar:bedcje:2010238. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Espai de Recerca en Economia)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.