The Delicate Balance of Special Autonomy Agreements: Lessons from Indonesia and the Philippines

Does asymmetric decentralization fulfill the twin promise of regional self-governance within a peaceful nation-state? Despite the obvious appeal of pacifying restive regions with distinct authority while keeping them as parts of the larger country, the theoretical promise of asymmetric decentralization often goes unfulfilled in reality. This is especially true where regional grievances were sufficient to lead to deadly civil conflict, and where those grievances include especially high levels of (perceived) economic exploitation and extreme poverty in the region compared to the rest of the nation. Comparison between the special status regions of Aceh and Papua (in Indonesia) and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and unsuccessful Cordillera Administrative Region (in the Philippines) highlights the importance of limiting veto players in agreeing on the design of special autonomy to resolving regional claim-making and mitigating regional economic deprivation. The comparative analysis suggests why special autonomy arrangements often fail to achieve the critical balance of solving existing regional grievances and preventing resumption of conflict and unrest.