Perceptions of Legitimacy in Asymmetric Decentralisation: Evidence from Spain

This article examines the conditions under which asymmetric arrangements granting enhanced powers to minority-nationalist regions sustain or undermine the legitimacy of the territorial decentralisation model among the remaining regions, drawing on evidence from Spain. While fiscal federalism scholarship has largely focused on whether asymmetric arrangements accommodate minority-nationalist regions and reduce secessionist pressures, less attention has been paid to how such arrangements are perceived by regions operating under the common decentralisation framework. Building on theories of concessionary federalism, the article argues that the stability of asymmetric systems depends not only on negotiated concessions between central governments and minority regions, but also on the conditional acceptance of those settlements by other regions. Drawing on elite interviews with senior finance officials in four Spanish autonomous communitiesÑAndalusia, Extremadura, Murcia and the Valencian CommunityÑcontextualised with survey data on public attitudes toward SpainÕs territorial model, the study tests three hypotheses concerning procedural legitimacy, systemic coherence and fiscal equalisation. The findings show that asymmetry loses acceptance when it is seen as insufficiently transparent, as weakening the broader decentralised system, or as generating persistent distributive grievances. Under such conditions, asymmetry may generate renewed territorial tensions rather than promoting stability. The article highlights the importance of transparent bargaining, robust intergovernmental forums and perceived distributive fairness in sustaining the legitimacy of asymmetric decentralisation.