Corruption in the Tax Administration: Is there Scope for Wage Incentives?
We use unique survey data from Bulgaria’s tax administration to evaluate the determinants of corruption risk. We construct a novel measure of corruptibility, defined as the gap between actual income and the self-reported corruption-proof income. The survey data show that raising incomes leads to lower corruption risk. However, incomes would have to almost triple to eliminate the risk of corruption, which makes such a policy intervention politically and financially unfeasible. The results suggest that strengthening monitoring and control might be more cost-effective for addressing corruption risks in the case of the tax administration in Bulgaria. They also suggest that gender, age, and tenure can be used to inform human resource allocation.
|Date of creation:||01 May 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 404-413-0235|
Web page: http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/index.html
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper1023. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paul Benson)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.