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Arztinduzierte Nachfrage in der ambulanten Versorgung - Bedeutung fuer eine Privatisierung von Leistungen der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung -



There is an ongoing debate on the phenomenon of physician induced demand. The question is whether the equilibrating forces of supply and demand are effective in the medical sector leading to a state of Pareto-optimality. The issue of improved availability vs. induced demand has not been solved yet. The consumer sovereignty thereby is a crucial determinant for bilateral contracting between the physician and the patient. Consequently, the discussion concerning what medical services should not be covered in mandatory health insurance has to consider conditions to realize consumer sovereignty. Here we discuss what changes in reimbursement, delivery of services, competition of physicians, and availability of information for patients might improve the performance of the medical sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Axel Olaf Kern, 2002. "Arztinduzierte Nachfrage in der ambulanten Versorgung - Bedeutung fuer eine Privatisierung von Leistungen der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung -," Discussion Paper Series 225, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:aug:augsbe:0225

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Thilo Pausch & Peter Welzel, 2002. "Credit Risk and the Role of Capital Adequacy Regulation," Discussion Paper Series 224, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
    2. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, July.
    3. Thomas C. Wilson, 1998. "Portfolio credit risk," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 71-82.
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    More about this item


    physician-induced demand; privatisation; mandatory health insurance; physician-patient relation; treatment process; information; principal-agent; moral hazard;

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

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