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Lattice Methods in Computation of Sequential Markov Equilibrium in Dynamic Games

This paper uses lattice programming methods along with the extension of Tarski's fixed point theorem due to Veinott (1992) and Zhou (1994) to establish sufficient conditions for existence of sequential symmetric Markov equilibrium in a large class of dynamic games. Our method is constructive and we provide specific algorithms for computing equilibrium. These results are applied to the classic fishwar game in the context of a finite horizon. JEL Classification: C62, C63, C73, D90

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University in its series Working Papers with number 2179545.

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Handle: RePEc:asu:wpaper:2179545
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  1. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 191-219, October.
  2. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
  3. Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1989. "Perfect equilibrium in non-randomized strategies in a class of symmetric dynamic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 153-177, February.
  4. Curtat, Laurent O., 1996. "Markov Equilibria of Stochastic Games with Complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 177-199, December.
  5. Manjira Datta & Leonard J. Mirman, . "Externalities, Market Power, and Resource Extraction," Working Papers 97/12, Arizona State University, Department of Economics.
  6. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-80, January.
  7. Manjira Datta & Leonard Mirman, . "Dynamic Externalities and Policy Coordination," Working Papers 2132841, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
  8. Santos, Manuel S, 1991. "Smoothness of the Policy Function in Discrete Time Economic Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1365-82, September.
  9. Manjira Datta, . "Externalities and Price Dynamics," Working Papers 9710, Arizona State University, Department of Economics.
  10. Zhou Lin, 1994. "The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 295-300, September.
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