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Sequential Candidate Entry: A Counterexample to the Osborne--Kats Conjecture

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  • Dmitry Dagaev

Abstract

Finitely many potential candidates sequentially choose an electoral position on the interval [0,1] or stay out, observing all prior choices. Voters have a uniform distribution of ideal positions on the same interval and vote non-strategically for a nearest candidate; candidates at the same position divide its votes. Candidates with the largest vote share divide a unit payoff equally, losing entrants receive a negative payoff, and staying out yields zero. In the mid-1980s, Osborne and Kats conjectured that, for every number $n\geq 2$ of players, the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcome has only the first and last players entering at the median. We refute the conjecture by establishing the existence of a different SPNE outcome for 12 players. Starting from the first two entries proposed earlier by de Vries, we select an SPNE strategy profile after the first two locations 1/2 and 1/10 that gives the second player payoff at least 1/10.

Suggested Citation

  • Dmitry Dagaev, 2026. "Sequential Candidate Entry: A Counterexample to the Osborne--Kats Conjecture," Papers 2611.10591, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2611.10591
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    File URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2611.10591
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