IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2610.29208.html

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence between Dominant-Strategy and Bayesian Mechanisms

Author

Listed:
  • Nir Bachrach
  • Yi-Chun Chen
  • Inbal Talgam-Cohen
  • Xiangqian Yang
  • Wanchang Zhang

Abstract

In auction design with limited information about bidders' value distributions, we provide an optimality foundation for dominant-strategy mechanisms. We show that simple dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DIC) mechanisms--either a second-price auction with a random reserve or the standard second-price auction without a reserve--achieve a revenue guarantee equal to the worst-case optimal revenue attainable by Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanisms, thereby establishing a robust form of DIC-BIC equivalence.

Suggested Citation

  • Nir Bachrach & Yi-Chun Chen & Inbal Talgam-Cohen & Xiangqian Yang & Wanchang Zhang, 2026. "Revenue Guarantee Equivalence between Dominant-Strategy and Bayesian Mechanisms," Papers 2610.29208, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2610.29208
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2610.29208
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2610.29208. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.