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Direct Representations for Interim Correlated Rationalizability

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  • Olivier Gossner
  • Rafael Veiel

Abstract

We study direct representations of information for interim correlated rationalizability. For a fixed finite payoff structure, each type induces a hierarchy of surviving action sets. Pushing the common prior through this map projects the information structure onto the solution concept's output language. When best-response regions are convex, this representation is direct: the solution concept applied to the hierarchy seen as a type is the identity. The induced distributions are characterized by level-by-level obedience constraints. Terminal ICR sets alone do not have this property. For arbitrary finite payoff structures, we refine each hierarchy level with a tag identifying a convex cell of its best-response region. Augmented hierarchies provide a direct representation and project onto the ordinary hierarchy. Full augmented hierarchies may form a continuum, but retaining only the tags at the boundaries of constant stretches of the ordinary hierarchy yields an exact countable representation with finitely many obedience constraints per type. Finite-type models are dense in terminal rationalizability outcome distributions.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Gossner & Rafael Veiel, 2026. "Direct Representations for Interim Correlated Rationalizability," Papers 2607.21851, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2026.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2607.21851
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    1. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Di Tillio Alfredo & Grillo Edoardo & Penta Antonio, 2011. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-40, March.
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