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Failure Modes of Deep Multi-Agent RL in Asynchronous Pricing: Reproducible Triggers, Trace Diagnostics, and a Partial Fix

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Listed:
  • Shree Murthy
  • Rohan Pandey

Abstract

We study two reproducible failure modes of deep multi-agent reinforcement learning in continuous-time pricing markets: (i) tacit cartel formation between competing DDPG agents, and (ii) actor--critic instability at high event rates. We instantiate both inside a single CT-MARL benchmark (Poisson-clocked price updates, observation latency $\delta$, interior-optimum logit demand), show that synchronous DDPG agents reliably trigger Failure Mode 1 with collusion index $\Delta = 0.69 \pm 0.11$, and quantify a partial microstructure fix: asynchrony alone cuts collusion by 48\% and adding latency drives it to a minimum of $\Delta = 0.28$. The fix has clearly documented costs: it is partial ($\Delta$ remains supra-Bertrand), it is non-monotone in $\delta$, and it does not survive Failure Mode 2, which emerges as DDPG critic divergence at $\lambda = 5$ and corrupts the phase-diagram cell at $(\lambda{=}5, \delta{=}1)$. We accompany the scalar collusion index with trajectory-level trace diagnostics that expose the within-episode signalling collapse and the post-shock non-recovery.

Suggested Citation

  • Shree Murthy & Rohan Pandey, 2026. "Failure Modes of Deep Multi-Agent RL in Asynchronous Pricing: Reproducible Triggers, Trace Diagnostics, and a Partial Fix," Papers 2606.09884, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2606.09884
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Diwas Paudel & Tapas K. Das, 2024. "Tacit algorithmic collusion in deep reinforcement learning guided price competition: A study using EV charge pricing game," Papers 2401.15108, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
    2. Martin Bichler & Julius Durmann & Matthias Oberlechner, 2025. "Algorithmic Pricing and Algorithmic Collusion," Business & Information Systems Engineering: The International Journal of WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK, Springer;Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. (GI), vol. 67(6), pages 971-979, December.
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