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Foresight Arena: An On-Chain Benchmark for Evaluating AI Forecasting Agents

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  • Maksym Nechepurenko
  • Pavel Shuvalov

Abstract

Evaluating the true forecasting ability of AI agents requires environments that are resistant to environments resistant to overfitting, free from centralized trust, and grounded in incentive-compatible scoring. Existing benchmarks either rely on static datasets vulnerable to training-data contamination, or measure trading PnL -- a metric conflating predictive accuracy with timing, sizing, and risk appetite. We introduce Foresight Arena, the first permissionless, on-chain benchmark for evaluating AI forecasting agents on real-world prediction markets. Agents submit probabilistic forecasts on binary Polymarket markets via a commit-reveal protocol enforced by Solidity smart contracts on Polygon PoS; outcomes are resolved trustlessly through the Gnosis Conditional Token Framework. Performance is measured by the Brier Score and a novel Alpha Score -- proper scoring rules that incentivize honest probability reporting and isolate predictive edge over market consensus. We provide a formal analysis: closed-form variance for per-market Alpha, the connection to Murphy's classical Brier decomposition, and a power analysis characterizing the number of rounds required to reliably distinguish agents of different skill levels. We show that detecting a true edge of $\alpha^* = 0.02$ at 80% power requires approximately 350 resolved binary predictions (50 rounds of 7 markets), while $\alpha^* = 0.01$ requires four times more. We complement these analytical results with a deterministic, seed-controlled simulation study calibrated to literature-reported Brier-score ranges, illustrating how Murphy decomposition distinguishes well-calibrated agents from market-tracking agents that fail through reduced resolution. Live results from the deployed benchmark will be reported in a future revision. All smart contracts and evaluation infrastructure are open-source.

Suggested Citation

  • Maksym Nechepurenko & Pavel Shuvalov, 2026. "Foresight Arena: An On-Chain Benchmark for Evaluating AI Forecasting Agents," Papers 2605.00420, arXiv.org, revised May 2026.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2605.00420
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jaden Zhang & Gardenia Liu & Oliver Johansson & Hileamlak Yitayew & Kamryn Ohly & Grace Li, 2026. "Prediction Arena: Benchmarking AI Models on Real-World Prediction Markets," Papers 2604.07355, arXiv.org.
    2. Robin Hanson, 2007. "Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules for Modular Combinatorial Information Aggregation," Journal of Prediction Markets, University of Buckingham Press, vol. 1(1), pages 3-15, February.
    3. Berg, Joyce E. & Nelson, Forrest D. & Rietz, Thomas A., 2008. "Prediction market accuracy in the long run," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 285-300.
    4. Gneiting, Tilmann & Raftery, Adrian E., 2007. "Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation," Journal of the American Statistical Association, American Statistical Association, vol. 102, pages 359-378, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Maksym Nechepurenko & Pavel Shuvalov, 2026. "Coordination as an Architectural Layer for LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems," Papers 2605.03310, arXiv.org.

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