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Dynamic Cheap Talk without Feedback

Author

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  • Atulya Jain

Abstract

We study a dynamic sender-receiver game in which the sender observes a state evolving according to a Markov chain but does not observe the receiver's action. Despite the absence of feedback, dynamic interaction partially restores commitment. We show that any equilibrium payoff of a persuasion model with partial commitment, where the sender can deviate to signaling policies that preserve the marginal distribution over messages, can be achieved as a uniform equilibrium payoff in the dynamic game. Moreover, any convex combination of such payoffs across message distributions can also be sustained. When the sender's payoff is state-independent, she achieves the Bayesian persuasion payoff.

Suggested Citation

  • Atulya Jain, 2026. "Dynamic Cheap Talk without Feedback," Papers 2604.26443, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2604.26443
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    References listed on IDEAS

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