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Pseudo-Substitutability: A Maximal Domain for Pairwise Stability in Matching Markets with Contracts

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Listed:
  • Nadia Gui~naz'u
  • Noelia Juarez
  • Paola Manasero
  • Pablo Neme
  • Jorge Oviedo

Abstract

We study the existence of pairwise stable allocations in matching markets with contracts and propose a domain restriction that guarantees their existence. Specifically, we define pseudo-substitutable preferences, a domain that strictly extends the classical notion of substitutability while still preserving the existence of pairwise stable allocations. This domain accommodates limited complementarities among contracts while retaining enough structure to preserve the key stability properties of substitutable preferences. Moreover, we show that, among all preference domains that contain the classical substitutable domain and guarantee the existence of pairwise stable allocations, the pseudo-substitutable domain is maximal. Our results establish that pairwise stability extends well beyond the classical substitutable domain.

Suggested Citation

  • Nadia Gui~naz'u & Noelia Juarez & Paola Manasero & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2026. "Pseudo-Substitutability: A Maximal Domain for Pairwise Stability in Matching Markets with Contracts," Papers 2604.18299, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2604.18299
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    3. Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2018. "A college admissions clearinghouse," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 859-885.
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