IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2603.12532.html

Self-Confirming Mechanisms

Author

Listed:
  • Zhiming Feng
  • Qingmin Liu

Abstract

This paper studies mechanism design environments in which the designer does not know the distribution of agents' private information a priori and instead learns from agents' behavior induced by the mechanism itself. We formalize a notion of self-confirming mechanisms and a refinement thereof, capturing the idea that an equilibrium mechanism is optimal given the designer's belief and that this belief is consistent with the information produced by the mechanism. We establish a fictitious revelation principle, showing that any incentive-compatible mechanism can be represented as a direct mechanism with filtered type reports that preserve the original mechanism's informational content. Applying the framework to a monopoly problem, we show that, subject to an equilibrium refinement, dominant-strategy self-confirming mechanisms are exactly posted-price mechanisms with locally revenue-maximizing prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhiming Feng & Qingmin Liu, 2026. "Self-Confirming Mechanisms," Papers 2603.12532, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2603.12532
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.12532
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2603.12532. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.