IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2601.14558.html

Analysis of Stakeholder Involvement in Nuclear Power Plant Cost Overruns and Implications for Contract Structuring

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher Forsyth
  • Levi M. Larsen
  • Ryan Spangler
  • Chandu Bolisetti
  • Jason Hansen
  • Botros Hanna
  • Abdalla Abou-Jaoude
  • Jia Zhou
  • Koroush Shirvan

Abstract

This study introduces a novel framework to model cost overruns associated with four key stakeholders in nuclear power plant construction: equipment suppliers, construction subcontractors, the design and management team, and creditors. The framework estimates the share of overruns caused by each stakeholder and the share of overruns they receive as payment. The results show that the share of cost overruns a given stakeholder causes and the share of overruns they receive as payment are often starkly different, which can lead to profit misallocations and litigation between parties, further exacerbating overruns. The magnitude of these potential profit misallocations is examined under three common contract structures - fixed-price, cost-plus, and performance-based - revealing the advantages and disadvantages of each framework for aligning stakeholder incentives. Regardless of the contract type chosen, strong owner involvement is crucial for project success, and the study concludes with specific recommendations for project owners seeking to minimize cost overruns.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher Forsyth & Levi M. Larsen & Ryan Spangler & Chandu Bolisetti & Jason Hansen & Botros Hanna & Abdalla Abou-Jaoude & Jia Zhou & Koroush Shirvan, 2026. "Analysis of Stakeholder Involvement in Nuclear Power Plant Cost Overruns and Implications for Contract Structuring," Papers 2601.14558, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2601.14558
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2601.14558
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2601.14558. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.