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Condorcet's Paradox as Non-Orientability

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Listed:
  • Ori Livson
  • Siddharth Pritam
  • Mikhail Prokopenko

Abstract

Preference cycles are prevalent in problems of decision-making, and are contradictory when preferences are assumed to be transitive. This contradiction underlies Condorcet's Paradox, a pioneering result of Social Choice Theory, wherein intuitive and seemingly desirable constraints on decision-making necessarily lead to contradictory preference cycles. Topological methods have since broadened Social Choice Theory and elucidated existing results. However, characterisations of preference cycles in Topological Social Choice Theory are lacking. In this paper, we address this gap by introducing a framework for topologically modelling preference cycles that generalises Baryshnikov's existing topological model of strict, ordinal preferences on 3 alternatives. In our framework, the contradiction underlying Condorcet's Paradox topologically corresponds to the non-orientability of a surface homeomorphic to either the Klein Bottle or Real Projective Plane, depending on how preference cycles are represented. These findings allow us to reduce Arrow's Impossibility Theorem to a statement about the orientability of a surface. Furthermore, these results contribute to existing wide-ranging interest in the relationship between non-orientability, impossibility phenomena in Economics, and logical paradoxes more broadly.

Suggested Citation

  • Ori Livson & Siddharth Pritam & Mikhail Prokopenko, 2026. "Condorcet's Paradox as Non-Orientability," Papers 2601.07283, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2601.07283
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Candeal, Juan Carlos & Indurain, Esteban, 1994. "The Moebius strip and a social choice paradox," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 407-412.
    2. Ori Livson & Mikhail Prokopenko, 2025. "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem as a Generalisation of Condorcet's Paradox," Papers 2510.09076, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2026.
    3. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1980. "Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences," MPRA Paper 8006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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