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Executive Accountability Systems and the Environmental Violations of State-Owned Enterprises in China

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  • Lihua Liu
  • Yi Chen
  • Mingli Xu

Abstract

Executive accountability is increasingly viewed as a critical mechanism for improving corporate environmental performance, especially in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that dominate high-emission sectors such as energy, infrastructure, and heavy industry. This study examines whether China's Accountability System for Irregular Operations and Investments (ASIOI) curbs environmental violations in SOEs. Exploiting the staggered regional implementation of ASIOI as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that the policy leads to a significant reduction in SOE environmental misconduct. Drawing on a criminology-based cost-benefit framework, we identify three underlying mechanisms: strengthened internal controls, increased green investment, and enhanced green innovation. Further analyses reveal that the deterrent effect of ASIOI is more pronounced in SOEs that exhibit weaker regulatory oversight and stronger incentives to commit violations. By focusing on politically embedded SOEs, this study shows how accountability mechanisms can catalyze proactive green transformation, enhancing the strategic role of public governance in sustainability transitions.

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  • Lihua Liu & Yi Chen & Mingli Xu, 2025. "Executive Accountability Systems and the Environmental Violations of State-Owned Enterprises in China," Papers 2508.08797, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2508.08797
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