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Two-Person Cooperative Games with delta-Rationality

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  • Fang-Fang Tang
  • Yongsheng Xu

Abstract

A player's payoff is modeled as consisting of two parts: a rational-value part and a distortion-value part. It is argued that the (total) payoff function should be used to explain and predict the behaviors of the players, while the rational value function should be used to conduct welfare analysis of the final outcome. We use the Nash demand game to illustrate our model.

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  • Fang-Fang Tang & Yongsheng Xu, 2025. "Two-Person Cooperative Games with delta-Rationality," Papers 2506.16465, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2506.16465
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2506.16465
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nick Baigent, 1995. "Behind The Veil Of Preference," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 46(1), pages 88-101, March.
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