IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/1902.08483.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Controlling systemic risk - network structures that minimize it and node properties to calculate it

Author

Listed:
  • Sebastian M. Krause
  • Hrvoje v{S}tefanv{c}i'c
  • Vinko Zlati'c
  • Guido Caldarelli

Abstract

Evaluation of systemic risk in networks of financial institutions in general requires information of inter-institution financial exposures. In the framework of Debt Rank algorithm, we introduce an approximate method of systemic risk evaluation which requires only node properties, such as total assets and liabilities, as inputs. We demonstrate that this approximation captures a large portion of systemic risk measured by Debt Rank. Furthermore, using Monte Carlo simulations, we investigate network structures that can amplify systemic risk. Indeed, while no topology in general sense is {\em a priori} more stable if the market is liquid [1], a larger complexity is detrimental for the overall stability [2]. Here we find that the measure of scalar assortativity correlates well with level of systemic risk. In particular, network structures with high systemic risk are scalar assortative, meaning that risky banks are mostly exposed to other risky banks. Network structures with low systemic risk are scalar disassortative, with interactions of risky banks with stable banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian M. Krause & Hrvoje v{S}tefanv{c}i'c & Vinko Zlati'c & Guido Caldarelli, 2019. "Controlling systemic risk - network structures that minimize it and node properties to calculate it," Papers 1902.08483, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1902.08483
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.08483
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Ferracci & Giulio Cimini, 2021. "Systemic risk in interbank networks: disentangling balance sheets and network effects," Papers 2109.14360, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1902.08483. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.