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Cooperative Vs. Non-Cooperative Games: A Comparison Of Solutions And Implications

Author

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  • Stefan Mladenoski

    (Faculty of Economics, American University of Europe-FON, North Macedonia)

Abstract

Game theory is considered a key framework in understanding the market economy. That is exactly why the comparison between cooperative and non-cooperative games and their outcomes is significant. Namely, when it comes to what constitutes a cooperative game, as the name suggests, it is a game in which two or more players make decisions together. In contrast, a non-cooperative game is one in which each player independently decides how to play their move. The aim of this paper is to compare the solutions and implications of cooperative and non-cooperative games, which will be explained through theory and practical examples. The methodological approach used in this paper is based on theoretical analysis, modeling of games, and examining the solutions obtained from the structure of the games. Cooperative and non-cooperative games both involve strategic decision-making by rational players, but they differ fundamentally in the role of communication and the possibility of binding agreements. While cooperative games allow for coalition formation and the achievement of efficient outcomes, non-cooperative games focus on individual strategies in conditions of limited trust, which often lead to less optimal but more realistic equilibria. The results of this comparison highlight the importance of selecting the appropriate game model when analyzing strategic situations, depending on the level of trust, the potential for cooperation, and the nature of interests among players. This opens space for further research toward the development of hybrid models and their practical application in areas such as economic markets or international relations.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Mladenoski, 2025. "Cooperative Vs. Non-Cooperative Games: A Comparison Of Solutions And Implications," Proceedings of the 5th International Conference "Economic and Business Trends Shaping the Future" 2024 040, Faculty of Economics-Skopje, Ss Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje.
  • Handle: RePEc:aoh:conpro:2025:i:6:p:356-366
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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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