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A Proposta Do Governo Em Interconexão E Unbundling Na Renovação Dos Contratos De Concessão Em Telecomunicações Em 2006

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  • César Mattos

Abstract

This article addresses the regulatory changes proposed for the telecommunications sector in Brazil regarding interconnection and unbundling policies. We summarize these policies after the privatization of Telebras, between 1998 and 2005, to be more able to evaluate the reform proposed for 2006, which we divide in nine main topics. They are 1) the adoption of the methodology of long run incremental cost - LRIC - as a parameter for tariff setting in interconnection, 2) the complementar use of a Fully Allocated Pricing mechanism for the sake of distributing common costs, 3) the abandonment, in practice, of the price cap regime, 4) the introduction of ties among interconnection and end user tariffs, 5) the replacement of the current tariff index (the IGP-DI) by the "Índice de Atualização de Tarifas" - Tariff Updating Index" (IST), 6) the new mechanic for the calculus of the discount factor "X", 7) the introduction of the "significative market power" concept, 8) the transition to a full Bill and Keep" system and 9) the effective use of "unbundling".

Suggested Citation

  • César Mattos, 2005. "A Proposta Do Governo Em Interconexão E Unbundling Na Renovação Dos Contratos De Concessão Em Telecomunicações Em 2006," Anais do XXXIII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 33rd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 107, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    • Handle: RePEc:anp:en2005:107
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    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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