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O princípio do sACRIFÍCIO eqüitativo no sistema tributário brasileiro


  • José Adrian Pintos Payeras
  • Marina Silva da Cunha


This article investigates, by means of the model developed for Young (1990), if the tributes direct, indirect and total in Brazil respect of the equal sacrifice principle. In all the scenes originated in the present analysis, as much the observed indirect tributes how much the total tributes present aliquot higher of the one than the estimates on the low income families, to the step that the aliquot ones observed of such categories of tributes are below of that they would have for the families richest when taken in consideration the principle of the equal sacrifice. This confirmation is valid in such a way for the tax structure current how much for the effective one in middle of the decade of 1970. The results show that the Brazilian tax system does not respect the capacity of payment of the families, fact that contributes for the maintenance of the indices of concentration of income in landings elevated.

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  • José Adrian Pintos Payeras & Marina Silva da Cunha, 2004. "O princípio do sACRIFÍCIO eqüitativo no sistema tributário brasileiro," Anais do XXXII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 32th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 026, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  • Handle: RePEc:anp:en2004:026

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    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement


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