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Curating Political Information: Who Shares What with Whom?

Author

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  • Yero Samuel Ndiaye

    (University of Cologne & Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics)

Abstract

Why do people supply information slanted toward their own positions? In four experiments, I investigate whether this slant reflects deliberate selection, which motives drive it, and how it affects those receiving information. People curate the truth, choosing which facts to pass on and to whom. Even with the usual explana tions ruled out, they value sharing facts that support their own political position beyond anything they expect those facts to do to others. They also want to cor rect and persuade others. However, they share less with those who hold different views on policy, even though their own expectations give them strategic reason to share more with them. Whenreceivers make real political donations, people select more on expected persuasion. Professional journalists select in a similar way, even without market or newsroom pressures. Individuals from whom facts are with held end up with less accurate beliefs and barely notice the selection. Selection among true information thus distorts what people believe without any falsehood, at a margin current policies such as fact-checking do not target.

Suggested Citation

  • Yero Samuel Ndiaye, 2026. "Curating Political Information: Who Shares What with Whom?," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 445, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:445
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    File URL: https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkdps/ECONtribute_445_2026.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2026
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

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