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Elite Selection in an Autocracy: The Career Costs of Political Ties

Author

Listed:
  • Leonie Bielefeld

    (University of Munich)

  • Cathrin Mohr

    (University of Bonn)

Abstract

We study the selection of the political elite in an autocratic state. Using detailed CV data on potential politicians in the German Democratic Republic, we track and quantify the position of individuals in the state hierarchy over time and exploit exogenous connections between individuals that were formed through imprisonment during the Nazi Era. We find asymmetric effects of being connected to the political elite: While being linked to the state's centre of power harms high-profile careers, they have positive effects on low-profile careers. An extensive analysis of potential mechanisms shows that the negative effect of being linked to the party leadership on individuals' probability to be part of the ruling elite is in line with anti-factionalism, whereas the positive effect on low-profile careers is in line with patronage.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonie Bielefeld & Cathrin Mohr, 2023. "Elite Selection in an Autocracy: The Career Costs of Political Ties," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 232, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:232
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    File URL: https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkdps/ECONtribute_232_2023.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2023
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political Economy; autocracy; political elite; selection mechanisms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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