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Strategic Communication of Economic Opportunities with Externalities

Author

Listed:
  • Mohamed Belhaj

    (Aix Marseille Univ, CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France)

  • Frédéric Deroïan

    (Aix Marseille Univ, CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France)

  • Mathieu Faure

    (Aix Marseille Univ, CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France)

Abstract

A subset of economic agents in a society is aware of the existence of an economic opportunity, and compete to exploit the opportunity. We study incentives to communicate about the existence of this economic opportunity when the exploitation of the opportunity by the winner generates externalities to other agents. We characterize the equilibria of the communication game and identify conditions under which more externalities generate more communication.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohamed Belhaj & Frédéric Deroïan & Mathieu Faure, 2026. "Strategic Communication of Economic Opportunities with Externalities," AMSE Working Papers 2605, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    • Handle: RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2605
    Note: Working paper AMSE 2026-05
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    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-05504606/document
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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