Incentive Contracts To Meet Functional Characteristics In Wheat Purchasing
Consistency of functional characteristics in hard red spring (HRS) wheat is a concern confronting sellers and buyers. This research analyzes contract incentives for importers with respect to cost and potential risk of acceptance. A principal-agent framework is utilized to examine contract incentives. In the principal-agent contract, the principal offers the contract, the agent rejects or accepts the contract, and then decides how much effort to apply. All this is subject to risk for the agent and moral hazard for the principal. An example is presented, for which equilibrium contract terms are a base price of 454 cents per bushel for low quality wheat and a premium of 36 cents per bushel if high quality is achieved. The premium for high quality is unchanged as the agent's outside option increases, but increases as the probability of conformance with high effort declines or as the agent's cost of high effort increases. Small changes in several of the parameter values (agent's outside option, agent's cost of high/low effort, principal value for high/low effort, and principal's outside options if the contract was not extended or if the agent rejects the contract) result in the principal not offering a contract.
|Date of creation:||2004|
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