IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/isfiwp/275461.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Asymmetric Dynamic Price Competition with Price Inertia

Author

Listed:
  • Fishman, Arthur

Abstract

This paper presents a model of dynamic price duopoly with short-term price inertia. A perturbation of consumer behavior, specifying that a consumer may purchase from the higher priced seller with positive probability, endows each duopolist with an arbitrarily small degree of monopoly power. It is shown that the slightest degree of asymmetry between the firms with respect to this monopoly power unambiguously identifies a firm which appropriates almost all the surplus from those consumers over whom the firms compete. This outcome is the unique Pareto dominant equilibrium if firms are restricted to state dependent strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Fishman, Arthur, 1989. "Asymmetric Dynamic Price Competition with Price Inertia," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275461, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275461
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275461
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275461/files/TEL-AVIV-FSWP-138.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.275461?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275461. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fotauil.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.