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Political Cycles : The Opposition Advantage

Author

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  • Gautier, Pascal
  • Soubeyran, Raphael

Abstract

We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share decreases the longer it stays in power. Parties chances of winning do not converge and, when the median voter is moderate enough, no party can maintain itself in power for ever. Finally, the more parties are specialized and the more public policies have long-term effects, the more political cycles are likely to occur.

Suggested Citation

  • Gautier, Pascal & Soubeyran, Raphael, 2005. "Political Cycles : The Opposition Advantage," Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance Working Papers 12194, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feempr:12194
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.12194
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    Keywords

    Political Economy;

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