IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/capriw/42492.html

The Transformation of Property Rights in Kenya's Maasiland: Triggers and Motivations

Author

Listed:
  • Mwangi, Esther

Abstract

This paper explores the puzzle of why the pastoral Maasai of Kajiado, Kenya, supported the individualization of their collectively held group ranches, an outcome that is inconsistent with theoretical expectation. Findings suggest that individuals and groups will seek to alter property rights in their anticipation of net gains from a new assignment, even as they seek to eliminate disadvantages that were present in the status quo property rights structure. Heightened perceptions of impending land scarcity, failures of collective decision making, the promise of new income opportunities and the possibility of accessing capital markets motivated individuals to support group ranch subdivision. More importantly individuals were confronted with a declining security of tenure over their lands. Their supporting a transition to individual rights also represents a rational response anticipated to secure land claims against unauthorized appropriations by both Maasai and non-Maasai elite. Given the differentiated structure of group ranch communities, the costs and benefits of property transformation were unevenly distributed. The political process yielded beneficial outcomes for those with access to decision making, while creating vulnerabilities for those with less access such as women, the youth and poor herders.

Suggested Citation

  • Mwangi, Esther, 2005. "The Transformation of Property Rights in Kenya's Maasiland: Triggers and Motivations," CAPRi Working Papers 42492, CGIAR, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:capriw:42492
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.42492
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/42492/files/capriwp35.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.42492?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean‐Philippe Platteau, 1996. "The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights as Applied to Sub‐Saharan Africa: A Critical Assessment," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 27(1), pages 29-86, January.
    2. Robert A. Blewett, 1995. "Property Rights as a Cause of the Tragedy of the Commons: Institutional Change and the Pastoral Maasai of Kenya," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 21(4), pages 477-490, Fall.
    3. Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mwangi, Esther & Dohrn, Stephan, 2006. "Biting the Bullet : How to Secure Access to Drylands Resources for Multiple Users," CAPRi Working Papers 42498, CGIAR, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mwangi, Esther, 2005. "The transformation of property rights in Kenya's Maasiland: triggers and motivations," CAPRi working papers 35, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    2. Leeson, Peter T. & Harris, Colin, 2018. "Wealth-destroying private property rights," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 1-9.
    3. Gochberg, William, 2021. "The social costs of titling land: Evidence from Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    4. christoph Engel, 2005. "Voice over IP. Competition Policy and Regulation," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2005_26, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    5. Alexandra Benham & Lee Benham, 2010. "The Costs of Exchange," Chapters, in: Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Mwangi, Esther, 2006. "Subdividing the Commons: The Politics of Property Rights Transformation in Kenya’s Maasailand," CAPRi Working Papers 42510, CGIAR, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    7. Gow, Hamish R. & Swinnen, Johan F.M., 1998. "How Foreign Direct Investment Has Stimulated Growth In The Central And Eastern European Agri-Food Sectors: Vertical Contracting And The Role Of Private Enforcement Capital," PRG Working Papers 31879, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance.
    8. Benito Arruñada & Marco Fabbri & Michael Faure, 2022. "Land Titling and Litigation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(1), pages 131-156.
    9. Wang, Hui & Riedinger, Jeffrey & Jin, Songqing, 2015. "Land documents, tenure security and land rental development: Panel evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 220-235.
    10. Meina Cai & Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Murtazashvili & Raufhon Salahodjaev, 2020. "Individualism and governance of the commons," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 175-195, July.
    11. Deslatte, Aaron & Szmigiel-Rawska, Katarzyna & Tavares, António F. & Ślawska, Justyna & Karsznia, Izabela & Łukomska, Julita, 2022. "Land use institutions and social-ecological systems: A spatial analysis of local landscape changes in Poland," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    12. Tamara Todorova, 2004. "The Firm in the Context of the Theory of Transaction Costs," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 1, pages 55-74.
    13. Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2008. "A Strategic Theory of the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Contracts: A Property Rights Approach," Working Papers 08-0108, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    14. Colleta Gandidzanwa & Aart Jan Verschoor & Thabo Sacolo, 2021. "Evaluating Factors Affecting Performance of Land Reform Beneficiaries in South Africa," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(16), pages 1-15, August.
    15. Daniel Ayalew Ali & Stefan Dercon & Madhur Gautam, 2011. "Property rights in a very poor country: tenure insecurity and investment in Ethiopia," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 42(1), pages 75-86, January.
    16. Tankari, Mahamadou Roufahi, 2015. "Action Levers For A Sustainable Farmland Management In Niger," International Journal of Food and Agricultural Economics (IJFAEC), Alanya Alaaddin Keykubat University, Department of Economics and Finance, vol. 3(4), pages 1-12, October.
    17. Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler, 1994. "Are Public Goods Myths?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(3), pages 369-385, July.
    18. Caballero-Miguez, Gonzalo & Fernández-González, Raquel, 2015. "Institutional analysis, allocation of liabilities and third-party enforcement via courts: The case of the Prestige oil spill," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 90-101.
    19. Carruthers, Bruce G., 1995. "Accounting, ambiguity, and the new institutionalism," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 313-328, May.
    20. Akaabre, Paul Boniface, 2023. "Traditional leasehold of land for residential and commercial use in Ghana: Structure and practices from the Golden Stool," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:capriw:42492. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ifprius.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.