Fire under land reform: Evidence from crop residue burning in China

Open crop residue burning creates serious environmental externalities, but the role of land tenure institutions in farmers’ burning decisions remains unclear. This paper examines how two major land reforms in rural China affected agricultural fires. Using county-level reform timing, satellite-based fire data, and a staggered difference-in-differences design, we find that the Land Contracting and Transfer Reform (LCTR) of 2003 increased agricultural fire occurrence and intensity, while the Land Titling Reform (LTR) of 2014 reduced it. We explain these opposing effects by showing that LCTR expanded production and limited the availability of labor, increasing the pressure to dispose of agricultural residue. By contrast, LTR reduced fires by changing planted area by strengthening tenure security, parcel level accountability and incentives to program long-term soil productivity. The findings show that land tenure institutions can affect pollution externalities in agriculture and that secure property rights can generate environmental benefits beyond direct regulation.