IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/acb/cbeeco/2012-599.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Beliefs and Public Good Provision with Anonymous Contributors

Author

Listed:
  • Wilfredo L. Maldonado
  • José A. Rodrigues-Neto

    ()

Abstract

We analyze a static game of public good contributions where finitely many anonymous players have heterogeneous preferences about the public good and heterogeneous beliefs about the distribution of preferences. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, the only individuals who make positive contributions are those who most value the public good and who are also the most pessimistic; that is, according to their beliefs, the proportion of players who value the most the public good is smaller than it would be according to any other possible belief. We predict whether the aggregate contribution is larger or smaller than it would be in an analogous game with complete information (and heterogeneous preferences), by comparing the beliefs of contributors with the true distribution of preferences. A tradeoff between preferences and beliefs arises if there is no individual who simultaneously has the highest preference type and the most pessimistic belief. In this case, there is a symmetric equilibrium, and multiple symmetric equilibria occur only if there are more than two preference types.

Suggested Citation

  • Wilfredo L. Maldonado & José A. Rodrigues-Neto, 2012. "Beliefs and Public Good Provision with Anonymous Contributors," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2012-599, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2012-599
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp599.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2012-599. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/feanuau.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.