Report NEP-REG-2000-10-11

This is the archive for NEP-REG, a report on new working papers in the area of Regulation. Natalia Fabra issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-REG

The following items were announced in this report:

• Thomas Grandner, 2000. "Optimal Contracts for Vertically Connected, Unionized Duopolies," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp071, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
• Michel Poitevin, 2000. "Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization?," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-32, CIRANO.
• Masahiko Aoki, 2000. "What are Institutions? How Should We Approach Them," Working Papers 00015, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
• Era Dabla-Norris, 2000. "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Corruption in Bureaucracies," IMF Working Papers 00/106, International Monetary Fund.
• Item repec:att:osloec:200018 is not listed on IDEAS anymore

• Georg Kirchsteiger & Muriel Niederle & Jan Potters, 2000. "Do Market Institutions Adapt Efficiently to Transaction Costs?," Vienna Economics Papers 0006, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.