Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-exp/2000-05-08.html
Report NEP-EXP-2000-05-08
This is the archive for NEP-EXP, a report on new working papers in the area of Experimental Economics. Daniel Houser issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-EXP
The following items were announced in this report:
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, , "Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 020.
- Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, , "On the Nature of Fair Behavior," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 017.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, , "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 010.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, , "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 040.
- Simon Gaechter & Armin Falk, , "Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 019.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, , "Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation?," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 034.
- Urs Fischbacher, , "z-Tree - Experimenter�s Manual," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 021.
- Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter & Ernst Fehr, , "Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 016.
- Vital Anderhub & Simon Gaechter & Manfred Koenigstein, , "Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, number 018.