Report NEP-DES-2023-03-13
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Hirata, Daisuke & 平田, 大祐 & Kasuya, Yusuke & 糟谷, 祐介 & Okumura, Yasunori & 奥村, 保規, 2023, "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Respect for Improvements," Discussion Papers, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, number 2023-01, Feb.
- Julien Combe, 2022, "Reallocation with Priorities and Minimal Envy Mechanisms," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03951678, Feb, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01465-x.
- Daniil Larionov, 2023, "Full Surplus Extraction From Colluding Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_392, Feb.
- David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi & Salvatore Modica, 2023, "The Tripartite Auction Folk Theorem," Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine, number 786969000000001811, Feb.
- Ronen Gradwohl & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2023, "Selling Data to a Competitor," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2302.00285, Feb.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-des/2023-03-13.html