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Report NEP-DES-2022-08-22
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Debasis Mishra & Kolagani Paramahamsa, 2022, "Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent," Discussion Papers, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, number 22-02, Jul.
- Lamprirni Zarpala & Dimitris Voliotis, 2022, "A core-selecting auction for portfolio's packages," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2206.11516, Jun, revised Feb 2024.
- Alexey Kushnir & James Michelson, 2022, "Optimal Multi-Dimensional Auctions: Conjectures and Simulations," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2207.01664, Jul.
- Zhaohua Chen & Chang Wang & Qian Wang & Yuqi Pan & Zhuming Shi & Zheng Cai & Yukun Ren & Zhihua Zhu & Xiaotie Deng, 2022, "Dynamic Budget Throttling in Repeated Second-Price Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2207.04690, Jul, revised Dec 2023.
- Kiran Tomlinson & Johan Ugander & Jon Kleinberg, 2022, "Ballot Length in Instant Runoff Voting," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2207.08958, Jul, revised Dec 2022.
- Gogulapati Sreedurga & Soumyarup Sadhukhan & Souvik Roy & Yadati Narahari, 2022, "Characterization of Group-Fair Social Choice Rules under Single-Peaked Preferences," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2207.07984, Jul.
- Takehiro Ito & Yuni Iwamasa & Naonori Kakimura & Naoyuki Kamiyama & Yusuke Kobayashi & Yuta Nozaki & Yoshio Okamoto & Kenta Ozeki, 2022, "Reforming an Envy-Free Matching," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2207.02641, Jul.
- Tom Demeulemeester & Juan S. Pereyra, 2022, "Rawlsian Assignments," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2207.02930, Jul, revised Oct 2024.
- Jamie Tucker-Foltz & Richard Zeckhauser, 2022, "Playing Divide-and-Choose Given Uncertain Preferences," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2207.03076, Jul, revised Oct 2024.
- Kazuya Kikuchi & Yukio Koriyama, 2022, "The Winner-Take-All Dilemma," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2206.09574, Jun.
- Edith Elkind & Abheek Ghosh & Paul W. Goldberg, 2022, "Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2207.08151, Jul.