Report NEP-DES-2020-02-24

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Federico Echenique & Antonio Miralles & Jun Zhang, 2020. "Constrained Pseudo-Market Equilibrium," Working Papers 1149, Barcelona School of Economics.
• Caterina Calsamiglia & Francisco Martinez-Mora & Antonio Miralles, 2020. "Cardinal Assignment Mechanisms: Money Matters More than it Should," Working Papers 1150, Barcelona School of Economics.
• Item repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/5kht5rc22p99sq5tol4efe4ssb is not listed on IDEAS anymore

• Salvador Barber‡ & Geoffroy de Clippel & Alejandro Neme & Kareen Rozen, 2020. "On Selecting the Right Agent," Working Papers 2020-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
• Daske, Thomas, 2020. "Efficient Incentives in Social Networks: Gamification and the Coase Theorem," EconStor Preprints 213805, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
• Silviu Pitis & Michael R. Zhang, 2020. "Objective Social Choice: Using Auxiliary Information to Improve Voting Outcomes," Papers 2001.10092, arXiv.org.
• Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Entry in group contests," Working Papers wp2020_02_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
• Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2020. "Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: Ha-Essential Equilibria," Working Papers CIE 130, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
• Geoffroy de Clippel & Jack Fanning & Kareen Rozen, 2020. "Bargaining over Contingent Contracts Under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2020-13, Brown University, Department of Economics.