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Report NEP-DES-2017-08-20
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2016, "Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2064R, Dec, revised Jul 2017.
- Gerardo Ferrara & Xin Li, 2017, "Central counterparty auction design," Bank of England working papers, Bank of England, number 669, Aug.
- Nosal, K.;, 2017, "Two-Sided Matching in Physician-Insurer Networks: Evidence from Medicare Advantage," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York, number 17/19, Aug.
- Breitmoser, Yves & Valasek, Justin, 2017, "A rationale for unanimity in committees," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, number SP II 2017-308.
- Sanchez Villalba, Miguel & Martinez Gorricho, Silvia, 2017, "Hybrid lotteries for financing public goods," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 80823.
- Julio Elias & Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, 2017, "Understanding repugnance: Implications for public policy," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo., Universidad del CEMA, number 614, Aug.