Report NEP-CDM-2024-02-19

This is the archive for NEP-CDM, a report on new working papers in the area of Collective Decision-Making. Stan C. Weeber issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-CDM

The following items were announced in this report:

• Masayuki Odora, 2024. "Fragility of The Condorcet Jury Theorem: Information Aggregation and Preference Aggregation," Working Papers 2308, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
• Maxim Senkov & Arseniy Samsonov, 2024. "Should Politicians be Informed? Targeted Benefits and Heterogeneous Voters," Papers 2401.04273, arXiv.org.
• Raphaël Franck & Victor Gay, 2024. "Urbanization and Electoral Success: Lawyers and Workers in Interwar France," CESifo Working Paper Series 10885, CESifo.
• Item repec:irs:cepswp:2024-01 is not listed on IDEAS anymore

• Clark, Andrew Eric & Cotofan, Maria Alexandra, 2023. "Are the upwardly mobile more left-wing?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121296, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
• Upward, Richard & Wright, Peter, 2024. "Income shocks, political support and voting behaviour," IWH Discussion Papers 1/2024, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
• Wesley H. Holliday, 2024. "An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting," Papers 2401.05657, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.