Report NEP-CDM-2024-02-19
This is the archive for NEP-CDM, a report on new working papers in the area of Collective Decision-Making. Marco Novarese issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-CDM
The following items were announced in this report:
- Masayuki Odora, 2024, "Fragility of The Condorcet Jury Theorem: Information Aggregation and Preference Aggregation," Working Papers, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, number 2308, Jan.
- Maxim Senkov & Arseniy Samsonov, 2024, "Should Politicians be Informed? Targeted Benefits and Heterogeneous Voters," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2401.04273, Jan.
- Raphaƫl Franck & Victor Gay, 2024, "Urbanization and Electoral Success: Lawyers and Workers in Interwar France," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10885.
- Item repec:irs:cepswp:2024-01 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Clark, Andrew Eric & Cotofan, Maria Alexandra, 2023, "Are the upwardly mobile more left-wing?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 121296, Jul.
- Upward, Richard & Wright, Peter, 2024, "Income shocks, political support and voting behaviour," IWH Discussion Papers, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), number 1/2024.
- Wesley H. Holliday, 2024, "An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2401.05657, Jan, revised Mar 2025.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-cdm/2024-02-19.html