IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/wsi/wschap/9789812833389_0009.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Incentive Conflict in Central Bank Responses to Sectoral Turmoil in Financial Hub Countries

In: Globalization And Systemic Risk

Author

Listed:
  • Edward J. Kane

    (Boston College, USA)

Abstract

The following sections are included:Understanding National Safety Nets and How Weakly They are LinkedComponents of national netsTissue connecting national nets in open economiesIncentive Conflicts Built into National Regulatory CulturesDimensions of regulatory cultureImportance of transparency and deterrencyWhat if monitoring and policing costs were zero?Global and National Incentive Conflicts in Safety Net ManagementWhat countries manage the global safety net?Differences in hub-country culturesRepurchase agreement as particularly opaque last resort loansHow repurchase agreements substitute for discount-window loansWhere Implicit Subsidies Originate: The Political Economy of Last Resort LendingPolicy ImplicationsSummary ImplicationsReferences

Suggested Citation

  • Edward J. Kane, 2009. "Incentive Conflict in Central Bank Responses to Sectoral Turmoil in Financial Hub Countries," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Douglas D Evanoff & David S Hoelscher & George G Kaufman (ed.), Globalization And Systemic Risk, chapter 9, pages 121-144, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812833389_0009
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9789812833389_0009
    Download Restriction: Ebook Access is available upon purchase.
    File URL: https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/9789812833389_0009
    Download Restriction: Ebook Access is available upon purchase.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marvin Goodfriend, 2001. "Why we need an \\"accord\\" for Federal Reserve credit policy : a note," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 23-32.
    2. Robert A. Eisenbeis & George G. Kaufman, 2005. "Bank crisis resolution and foreign-owned banks," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 90(Q4), pages 1-18.
    3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    5. Goodfriend, Marvin, 1994. "Why We Need an "Accord" for Federal Reserve Credit Policy: A Note," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(3), pages 572-580, August.
    6. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    7. William Dudley, 2008. "May you live in interesting times: the sequel," Proceedings 1071, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Philip Strahan, 2008. "Liquidity Production in 21st Century Banking," NBER Working Papers 13798, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "Recent developments in German corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
    2. Yeddou, Nacera & Pourroy, Marc, 2020. "Bank liquidity creation: Does ownership structure matter?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 116-131.
    3. Nachane, D M & Ghosh, Saibal & Ray, Partha, 2005. "Bank nominee directors and corporate performance: micro evidence for India," MPRA Paper 1714, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Sugato Chakravarty & Chiraphol N. Chiyachantana & Christine Jiang, 2011. "THE CHOICE OF TRADING VENUE AND RELATIVE PRICE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL TRADING: ADRs VERSUS THE UNDERLYING SECURITIES IN THEIR LOCAL MARKETS," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 34(4), pages 537-567, December.
    5. Harvey, Campbell R. & Lins, Karl V. & Roper, Andrew H., 2004. "The effect of capital structure when expected agency costs are extreme," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 3-30, October.
    6. Edward Kane, 2001. "Financial safety nets: reconstructing and modelling a policymaking metaphor," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 237-273.
    7. Lin, Chen & Ma, Yue & Malatesta, Paul & Xuan, Yuhai, 2013. "Corporate ownership structure and the choice between bank debt and public debt," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 517-534.
    8. Hellwig, Martin, 2000. "Corporate governance and the financing of investment for structural change," Papers 00-32, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    9. Kashefi Pour, Eilnaz & Lasfer, Meziane, 2019. "Taxes, governance, and debt maturity structure: International evidence," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 136-161.
    10. David B. Audretsch & Erik E. Lehmann, 2013. "Corporate governance in newly listed companies," Chapters, in: Mario Levis & Silvio Vismara (ed.), Handbook of Research on IPOs, chapter 9, pages 179-206, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Philippe Frouté, 2007. "Theoretical foundation for a debtor friendly bankruptcy law in favour of creditors," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 201-214, December.
    12. García-Kuhnert, Yamileh & Marchica, Maria-Teresa & Mura, Roberto, 2015. "Shareholder diversification and bank risk-taking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 602-635.
    13. repec:onb:oenbwp:y:2010:i:1:b:1 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Hai-Chin Yu & Ben Sopranzetti & Cheng-Few Lee, 2015. "The impact of banking relationships, managerial incentives, and board monitoring on corporate cash holdings: an emerging market perspective," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 353-378, February.
    15. Ndikumana, Leonce, 2005. "Financial development, financial structure, and domestic investment: International evidence," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 651-673, June.
    16. Sándor Gardó, 2010. "Bank Governance and Financial Stability in CESEE: A Review of the Literature," Focus on European Economic Integration, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 1, pages 6-31.
    17. Martynova, Marina & Renneboog, Luc, 2009. "What determines the financing decision in corporate takeovers: Cost of capital, agency problems, or the means of payment?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 290-315, June.
    18. Jorge Andrés Munoz Mendoza & Sandra María Sepúlveda Yelpo & Carmen Lissette Veloso Ramos, 2018. "Effects of Corporate Policies and Governance Practices on Ownership Structure: Evidence from Chilean Firms," Revista Finanzas y Politica Economica, Universidad Católica de Colombia, vol. 10(2), pages 269-286, November.
    19. Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 2001. "Corporate Governance: Stakeholder Value Versus Shareholder Value," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 5(2), pages 107-128, June.
    20. Miguel A. Ferreira & Pedro Matos, 2012. "Universal Banks and Corporate Control: Evidence from the Global Syndicated Loan Market," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(9), pages 2703-2744.
    21. Degryse, Hans & de Jong, Abe, 2006. "Investment and internal finance: Asymmetric information or managerial discretion?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 125-147, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Globalization; Banking; Financial Markets; Systemic Risk; Financial Crisis; Contagion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812833389_0009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tai Tone Lim (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.worldscientific.com/page/worldscibooks .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.