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On some winning strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma or Mr. Nice Guy and the Cosa Nostra

In: The Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma 20 Years On

Author

Listed:
  • Wolfgang Slany

    (Institut fü Softwaretechnologie, Inffeldgasse 16b/II, TU Graz, A-8010 Graz, Austria)

  • Wolfgang Kienreich

    (Know-Center, Inffeldgasse 21a/II, 8010 Graz, Austria)

Abstract

The following sections are included:IntroductionAnalysis of the Tournament Results2004 competition, league 1 (standard IPD rules, with 223 participating strategies)2004 competition, league 2 (uncertainty IPD variant, same 223 participating strategies as in the first league)2005 competition, league 1 (standard IPD rules, with 192 participating strategies)2005 competition, league 4 (standard IPD rules, but only non-group, individual strategies were allowed to participate; 50 participating strategies)Analysis of OmegaTitForTat's (OTFT) performanceThe practical difficulty of detecting collusionDetails of Our StrategiesOmegaTitForTat, or Mr. Nice Guy meets the iterated prisoner's dilemmaSuspicionRandomnessExploitsOTFTExamplesOTFT's behaviour laid bareOur group strategiesThe Cosa Nostra group strategy, or Organized crime meets the iterated prisoner's dilemmaThe gory details of the Cosa Nostra group strategyThe Emperor And His Clone WarriorsThe Stealth Collusion group strategyAnalysis of the Performance of the StrategiesOmegaTitForTatGroup strategiesCollusion detection is an undecidable problemConclusionAcknowledgmentsReferences

Suggested Citation

  • Wolfgang Slany & Wolfgang Kienreich, 2007. "On some winning strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma or Mr. Nice Guy and the Cosa Nostra," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma 20 Years On, chapter 8, pages 171-204, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812770684_0008
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    Keywords

    Iterated Prisoners Dilemma; Game Theory; Cooperation; Defection; Competition; Axelrod;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C1 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C5 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling

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