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On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies

In: Differential Information Economies

Author

Listed:
  • Dionysius Glycopantis

    (City University)

  • Allan Muir

    (City University)

  • Nicholas C. Yannelis

    (University of Illinois)

Abstract

Summary In the context of differential information economies, with and without free disposal, we consider the concepts of Radner equilibrium, rational expectations equilibrium, private core, weak fine core and weak fine value. We look into the possible implementation of these concepts as perfect Bayesian or sequential equilibria of noncooperative dynamic formulations. We construct relevant game trees which indicate the sequence of decisions and the information sets, and explain the rules for calculating ex ante expected payoffs. The possibility of implementing an allocation is related to whether or not it is incentive compatible. Implementation through an exogenous third party or an endogenous intermediary is also considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Dionysius Glycopantis & Allan Muir & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2005. "On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 619-650, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-26979-3_32
    DOI: 10.1007/3-540-26979-7_32
    as

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