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Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information

In: Differential Information Economies

Author

Listed:
  • Leonidas C. Koutsougeras

    (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

  • Nicholas C. Yannelis

    (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

Abstract

Summary We analyze the coarse, the fine, and the private core allocation of an exchange economy with differential information. The basic questions that we address are whether the above concepts are: (i) coalitionally incentive compatible, i.e., does truthful revelation of information in each coalition occur; and (ii) taking into account the information superiority or information advantage of an agent. Moreover, the above three concepts are examined in the presence of externalities and a comparison and interpretation of all of three core notions is provided.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonidas C. Koutsougeras & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2005. "Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 227-248, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-26979-3_13
    DOI: 10.1007/3-540-26979-7_13
    as

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