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Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies

In: Differential Information Economies

Author

Listed:
  • Dionysius Glycopantis

    (City University)

  • Nicholas C. Yannelis

    (University of Illinois)

Abstract

Summary We summarize here basic cooperative and noncooperative equilibrium concepts, in the context of differential information economies with a finite number of agents. These, on the one hand, game theoretic, and, on the other hand, Walrasian equilibrium type concepts are explained, and their relation is pointed out, in the context of specific economies with one or two goods and two or three agents. We analyze the incentive compatibility of several cooperative and noncooperative concepts, and also we discuss briefly the possible implementation of these concepts as perfect Bayesian equilibria through the construction of relevant game trees. This possibility is related to whether the allocation is incentive compatible. This depends on whether there is free disposal or not.

Suggested Citation

  • Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2005. "Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 1-53, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-26979-3_1
    DOI: 10.1007/3-540-26979-7_1
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    Cited by:

    1. Edwards, Robert A. & Routledge, Robert R., 2022. "Information, Bertrand–Edgeworth competition and the law of one price," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    2. Bhowmik, Anuj & Cao, Jiling, 2018. "Ex-post core, fine core and rational expectations equilibrium allocations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 128-138.
    3. Erik Balder & Nicholas Yannelis, 2009. "Bayesian–Walrasian equilibria: beyond the rational expectations equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(2), pages 385-397, February.

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