IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/stcchp/978-3-540-79832-3_7.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Choice-Consistent Resolutions of the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off

In: Rational Choice and Social Welfare

Author

Listed:
  • Koichi Tadenuma

    (Hitotsubashi University, Kunitachi)

Abstract

It is not rare that multiple criteria are applied to make individual or social decisions. In the context of resource allocation problems, most prominent criteria are efficiency and equity of allocations. Pareto efficiency is probably the most widely accepted criterion among economists, but it is silent about the distributional equity of allocations. On the other hand, several concepts of equity have been proposed and extensively studied in welfare economics. Two of them are central: no-envy (Foley, 1967 and Kolm, 1972) and egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978). We say that an allocation is envy-free if no agent prefers the consumption bundle of any other agent to his own and that an allocation is egalitarian-equivalent if there is a consumption bundle, called the reference bundle, such that every agent is indifferent between the bundle and his own.

Suggested Citation

  • Koichi Tadenuma, 2008. "Choice-Consistent Resolutions of the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Koichi Tadenuma & Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara (ed.), Rational Choice and Social Welfare, pages 119-138, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-79832-3_7
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79832-3_7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Salvador Barberà & Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2021. "Daunou’s voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 259-289, February.
    2. Norihito Sakamoto, 2013. "No-envy, efficiency, and collective rationality," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1033-1045, April.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-79832-3_7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.