IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/stcchp/978-3-319-64659-6_5.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Two-Stage Election Procedures

In: Elections, Voting Rules and Paradoxical Outcomes

Author

Listed:
  • William V. Gehrlein

    (University of Delaware)

  • Dominique Lepelley

    (University of La Réunion)

Abstract

The standard two-stage voting rules Plurality Elimination and Negative Plurality Elimination are evaluated relative to Borda Rule on the basis of Condorcet Efficiency. Theoretical analysis shows that the Condorcet Efficiency of these two-stage voting rules consistently marginally dominate Borda Rule as the various measures of group mutual coherence change. However, it is also found that the probability that either of the two-stage rules will elect a different candidate than the winner by Borda Rule is quite small. Empirically-based analysis reinforces this observation to lead to the general conclusion that the additional effort that is required to use a two-stage voting rule, rather than simply using Borda Rule, is not likely to be worthwhile. Other benefits are considered that result from using Borda Rule rather than a two-stage voting rule.

Suggested Citation

  • William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2017. "Two-Stage Election Procedures," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Elections, Voting Rules and Paradoxical Outcomes, chapter 0, pages 117-140, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-64659-6_5
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-64659-6_5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2018. "The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency," Working Papers hal-01757761, HAL.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-64659-6_5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.